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2007. The earnings quality is measured by four separate earnings attributes: accruals 
quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, and earnings smoothness. We find 
that the stressed/bankrupt firms prefer opportunistic earnings management; the non-
stressed/non-bankrupt firms are more likely to choose more efficient earnings 
management than the stressed/non-bankrupt firms. We find that earnings management 
performs better than earnings quality in predicting future profitability. We also find that 
the earnings quality has deteriorated over the sample period; the number of 













1. Introduction  
Earnings management is a universal phenomenon in firms’ financial reporting or 
release of earnings-related information. The purpose of earnings management is to 
demonstrate reasonable earnings quality that meets either the shareholders’ expectation, 
or the requirement of obtaining relevant authorization from regulators (Francis et al., 
2008). Thus, earnings management has much in common with earnings quality 
(represented by accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, and 
earnings smoothness in our study).  For instance, highly managed earnings can yield low-
quality earnings (Lo, 2008), as the “artificial” information may lead to an incorrect 
decision. However, the absence of earnings management is insufficient to guarantee high-
quality earnings, because other factors (such as capital market and management 
compensation) contribute to the quality of earnings (Lo, 2008). 
Earnings management is widespread in China’s listed firms (Noronha et al., 2008; 
Wu, 2004 ). One important reason is the administrative governance approach adopted in 
China, where regulators often rely on accounting numbers to govern the listed firms (Lu 
& Liu, 2007). For example, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
requires listed firms to meet a certain level of return on equity (ROE) before they can 
apply for permission to issue additional shares to existing shareholders (rights issues); 
and the most important criterion for de-listing a listed company is a reported net loss for 
three consecutive years (Qi et al., 2005). A peculiar feature of the Chinese listed firms is 
that some of them are in financial distress and should be bankrupt in terms of the criteria 
used in developed countries. However, they are still being listed on the stock markets in 
China, in contrast with the practice of mature stock markets in developed countries. 
McKeown, Mutchler, and Hopwood (1991, hereafter MMH) create a model to 
divide the firms into financially stressed and non-stressed. They find that the financially 
stressed and non-stressed firms employ contrasting earnings management techniques and 
differing earning quality. Altman (2006) develops an Emerging Market Score model 
(EMS, hereafter) to group firms as bankrupt and non-bankrupt, and states that the 
bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms can be identified to some extent by earnings 
management approaches.  
         The firms listed on the emerging stock markets of China can be described by both 
MMH and EMS models. Thus, we borrow the two models to conduct an analysis on 
earnings management and earnings quality in relation to the firms’ financial status of 
being stressed or non-stressed, and their status as bankrupt ornon-bankrupt; classifying 
firms into four quadrants: (1) stressed/bankrupt (SB), (2) non-stressed/bankrupt (NSB), (3) 
stressed/non-bankrupt (SNB), and (4) non-stressed/non-bankrupt (NSNB). However, due 
to zero samples of firms in the quadrant of NSB, our research focuses on firms in the 
quadrants of SB, SNB, and NSNB, disregarding the empty class of NSB.  
To our best knowledge, no research until now has been published on the earnings 
management and earnings quality with the classifications of Chinese listed firms as SB, 
SNB and NSNB. This study empirically investigates how the four earnings attributes 
affect future profitability, examining the efficiency of earnings management in each firm 
classification (SB, SNB and NSNB), and thus it fills a void. We find that the 
stressed/bankrupt firms are more likely to choose opportunistic earnings management; the 
other two firm classifications are more likely to choose efficient earnings management, 
with the non-stressed/non-bankrupt firms more likely to choose more efficient earnings 
management than stressed/non-bankrupt firms. We also find earnings management is a 
better measure than earnings quality, in predicting future profitability. Further, we find 
that as the earnings quality has deteriorated over the study period, the number of 
stressed/bankrupt firms increases and the number of non-stressed/non-bankrupt firms 
decreases.  
        This research contributes to the literature in the following three ways. First, it is the 
first study to classify the Chinese listed firms along two dimensions: stressed versus non-
stressed, and bankrupt versus non-bankrupt. Sample firms are then divided into three 
groups: stressed bankrupt, stressed non-bankrupt and non-stressed non-bankrupt, due to 
zero observations in the non-stressed bankrupt category. Second, it extends the existing 
literature such as Francis et al. (2004, 2005, 2007, 2008), Boonlert-U-Thai et al. (2006)  
and Siregar and Utama (2008) by investigating the type of earnings management and the 
effect of earnings quality in Chinese listed firms. Third, this research can be a reference 
to assist standard setters, security analysts, regulators and other accounting-information 
users in appraising relation between the earnings quality and earnings management, 
across stress level and bankruptcy level axes for Chinese listed firms. 
 In the next section, we review the literature and develop hypotheses. Section 3 
explains the measures of earning quality and classification of the Chinese listed firms. 
Section 4 describes the sample selection and basic statistics. Section 5 presents the 




2. Literature review, hypothesis development and research design 
2.1 Literature review 
Earnings management in China 
      Research on earnings management in China has flourished in recent years. Extant 
studies have documented that earnings management is a widespread phenomenon in 
China. Chen and Yuan (2004) and Jian and Wong (2004) provide strong evidence that 
Chinese listed firms boost their earnings dramatically to gain authorization for initial 
public offerings (IPOs), to issue new shares or to avoid being delisted. Aharony et al. 
(2000) show the existence of earnings management prior to the IPOs of Chinese stock 
sold to foreign investors, and point out the existence of earnings management in the IPOs 
of China’s B-share (quoted and settled in foreign currency; mainlanders and foreigners 
can trade in foreign currency) and H-share (also listed on Hong Kong and other foreign 
Stock markets) firms; Wei et al. (2000) document a case of earnings management in 
China’s A-share (quoted in Renminbi, and only mainlanders and selected foreign 
institutional investors are allowed to trade) IPO firms. Chen and Yuan (2004) document a 
sample of China’ listed firms that applied earnings management for rights issues during 
1996-1998.  
      Prior studies also report the impact of managerial compensation incentives on 
earnings management in China’s listed firms. Kim and Park (2005) and Liu et al. (2003) 
show that high managerial compensation of listed firms in China is closely related to 
firms’ profitability manipulation. Liu and Lu (2004) find that earnings management of 
Chinese listed firms is mainly induced by controlling owners’ tunneling activity. Zhu and 
Su (2002) find that small and medium-sized firms in China have incentives to manage 
earnings for management compensation and tax expense savings. Ting et al. (2009) 
examine the relationships that exist among the default risk, earnings management, and 
top management compensation of publicly-listed firms on the Chinese stock market, 
revealing a greater likelihood of default amongst larger discretionary accruals and lower 
top management compensation. 
         Meanwhile, many studies document earnings management in response to the “10 
percent rule”
1
 in China.  For instance, Chen and Yuan (2004) and Haw et al. (2005) have 
explored the fact that listed firms in China were required to achieve a minimum return on 
equity (ROE) of 10 percent in each of the previous three years before they could apply 
for permission to issue additional shares. Chen et al. (2000) and Haw et al. (2003) show 
that firms whose ROE are in the range of 10 to 11 percent (“borderline firms”) have 
higher discretionary items such as abnormal accruals and non-operating income than 
other firms. Haw et al. (2003) further show that the borderline firms’ earnings-response 
coefficient in relation to earnings management is lower than that of the control firms, and 
that the borderline firms that conducted rights issues later had less managed earnings than 
those that did not. 
 
Prior research on efficient and opportunistic earnings management  
Several researchers have found evidence that suggests the opportunistic perspective is 
a common motivation for earnings management. Gaver et al. (1995), and Holthausen et al. 
(1995) find evidence that accruals management focuses on the manipulation of bonus 
income. Balsam et al. (2002) examine a negative relationship between unexpected 
discretionary accruals and stock returns around the earnings announcement date, and 
indicate that the market views discretionary accruals as opportunistic.  
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 In July 2002, the Chinese government imposed a minimum ROE of 10 percent as a threshold of 
qualification for firms to initiate seasoned-equity offerings.  
In contrast, other studies find evidence that earnings management is efficient, rather 
than opportunistic. Subramanyam (1996), Gul et al. (2000), Krishnan (2003) and Kothari 
et al. (2005) conclude that the behavior of discretionary accruals is consistent with 
efficient earnings management, as discretionary accruals have a significant positive 
relationship with future profitability. Siregar and Utama (2008) find evidence that the 
type of earnings management selected by Jakarta Stock Exchange-listed firms tends 
toward efficient earnings management. 
 
Prior research on Earnings quality 
Previous research related to measurement of both earnings quality and the tests on its 
capital market effects is relatively scarce. Francis et al. (2004) improve the literature on 
earnings quality by examining the relation between the cost of equity capital and seven 
attributes of earnings: accruals quality, persistence, predictability, smoothness, value 
relevance, timeliness, and conservatism. Their empirical models predict a positive 
association between information quality and cost of equity; they find that firms with the 
least favorable values of each earnings attribute generally experience larger cost of equity 
than firms with the most favorable values of each earnings attribute. Francis et al. (2007) 
investigate the relations among voluntary disclosure, earnings quality, and cost of capital 
and find that firms with favourable earnings attributes have more expansive voluntary 
disclosures than firms with poor earnings attributes. 
Francis et al. (2008) also examine the link between CEO reputation and earnings 
attributes quality by considering a managerial human capital dimension (CEO reputation 
as proxy) in explaining the earnings quality (earnings attributes as proxy) of firms’ 
reporting decisions. Francis et al. (2005) investigate the relation among the accruals 
quality as an earnings attribute, and the cost of debt and cost of equity. Measuring 
accruals quality as the standard deviation of residuals from regressions, relating current 
accruals to cash flows, they find that poorer accruals quality is associated with larger 
costs of debt and cost of equity. Boonlert-U-Thai et al. (2006) explore the effects of 
investors-protection on reported earnings quality, where the earnings quality is measured 
by four earning attributes (accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, 
and earnings smoothness), finding that favorable values of each earnings attribute occur 
in countries whose institutional characteristics provide relatively strong investor-
protection. 
 
2.2 Hypothesis development 
Earnings quality has a close relationship with earnings management in evaluating an 
entity’s financial health (Lo, 2008). Earnings management directly affects the overall 
integrity of financial reporting and significantly influences resource allocation throughout 
firms (Dechow et al., 1995; Healy & Wahlen, 1999). There are two types of earnings 
management: efficient and opportunistic (Subramanyam, 1996). Earnings management is 
efficient if managers use their discretion to communicate private information about firm 
profitability, which is yet to be reflected in the historical cost-based earnings; it is 
opportunistic if managers use their discretion to maximize their personal utility rather 
than communicating private information about firm profitabiloity (Subramanyam, 1996). 
Siregar and Utama (2008) measure earnings management as discretionary accrual (also 
usedas the measure of earnings management in this paper); they calculate discretionary 
accrual as the residuals, from the firm-specific expectations model suggested by Jones 
(1991).   
Subramanyam (1996) demonstrates that discretionary accruals have the ability to 
signal levels of future profitability with a positive relation, after controlling for current 
levels of operating cash flows and non-discretionary accruals. Therefore, we test whether 
or not the discretionary accruals have an effect on future profitability, by identifying 
efficient or opportunistic earnings management among the three types of Chinese firms 
(SB, SNB, and NSNB).  If earnings management is efficient, then discretionary accruals 
have a significant positive relationship with future profitability. If it is opportunistic, then 
discretionary accruals have a significant negative relationship or insignificant relationship 
with future profitability.  
         We predict that the financial statements of near-bankrupt firms are more likely to 
reflect evidence of material overstatements of earnings (as such firms are presumably 
motivated by a desire to conceal signs of distress) than those of non-bankrupt firms. We 
assume that stressed firms are more likely to manipulate earnings than non-stressed firms, 
across both bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms. We therefore argue that the type of 
earnings management is opportunistic for SB firms, less efficient for SNB firms and more 
efficient for NSNB firms in relation to the value of the four earnings attributes. 
In summary, the four hypotheses lead to different predictions between the earnings 
management and earnings quality:  
H 1: Earnings quality measured as accruals quality value indicates that the earnings 
management is more likely to be opportunistic for SB firms, less efficient for SNB 
firms and more efficient for NSNB firms. 
H 2: Earnings quality measured as earnings persistence value indicates that the 
earnings management is more likely to be opportunistic for SB firms, less efficient for 
SNB firms and more efficient for NSNB firms. 
H 3: Earnings quality measured as earnings predictability value indicates that the 
earnings management is more likely to be opportunistic for SB firms, less efficient for 
SNB firms and more efficient for NSNB firms. 
H 4: Earnings quality measured as smoothness value indicates that the earnings 
management is more likely to be opportunistic for SB firms, less efficient for SNB 
firms and more efficient for NSNB firms. 
 
3. Measures of earnings quality and the classification of firms 
Prior literature has also characterized the four earnings attributes as indicators of 
earnings quality: accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, and 
earnings smoothness (Francis et al., 2004). Accruals quality refers to the extent to which 
accruals map onto the related cash flow realization, when accruals shift or adjust the 
recognition of cash flows over time so that the adjusted earnings offer a better measure 
for predicting future earnings and cash flows (Boonlert-U-Thai et al., 2006; Krishnan, 
2003). Earnings persistence captures earnings sustainability; persistent earnings are 
viewed as desirable because they are recurring (Penman & Zhang, 2002; Richardson, 
2003; Scott, 2000). Earnings predictability refers to the ability of current earnings to 
predict future earnings. Earnings smoothness refers to the use of accruals to smooth 
earnings; low smoothness means that a firm’s management has not engaged in smoothing 
practices (Chaney & Lewis, 1995; Demski, 1998; Fudenberg & Tirole, 1995; Ronen & 
Sadan, 1981  ). 
Our analyses require measures of the four earnings attributes. We measure the four 
attributes on a firm- and year-specific basis, using the relevant accounting information for 
rolling five-year windows, t-4,……t. The use of the firm as its own benchmark mitigates 
concerns that differences among firms in a given industry give rise to noisy measures of 
the constructs (Francis et al., 2004). However, the firm-specific approach requires a time-
series of observations about each firm, while an industry approach requires only a 
sufficient size cross-section of firms in a given industry at a point in time (Francis et al., 
2004).  
 
Accruals quality  
The difference between earnings and cash is accruals (Bao & Bao, 2004; Schipper & 
Vincent, 2003; Sloan, 1996). One role of accruals is to shift or adjust the recognition of 
cash flows over time so that the adjusted number better measures firm performance. 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) develop a measure of accruals quality and argue that the 
quality of accruals and earnings is lowered by the magnitude of estimation error in 
accruals.  
The measure of accruals quality is based on Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) model 
relating to total current accruals to the lagged, current, and future cash flows from 
operations: 
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Where: 
TCA j, t                   Firm j’s total current accruals in t (∆CA j, t− ∆CL j, t− ∆Cash  j, t      
                               + ∆STDEBT j., t + ∆ TP j, t); 
Total Asset j, t−1      Firm j’s total assets in year t-1; 
CFO j, t                   Firm j’s cash flow from operations in year t;  
CA j, t                      Firm j’s current assets in year t; 
CL j, t                      Firm j’s current liabilities in year t; 
Cash j, t                   Firm j’s cash in year t; 
STDEBT j, t            Firm j’s debt in current liabilities in year t; and 
TP j, t                       Firm j’s taxes payable in year t. 
 
       For each firm-year, we estimate Equation (1) using rolling five-year windows and 
measure the accruals quality (AccrualsQualityj,t) as the variable of interest. 
AccrualsQuality, j, t = σ (εˆj,t), is equal to the standard deviation of estimated residuals. 
Large (small) values of AccrualsQuality correspond to lower (higher) accruals quality 
and lower (higher) earnings quality. 
 
Earnings persistence  
Kormendi and Lipe (1987) regress current earnings on last year’s earnings to estimate 
the slope-coefficient estimates of earnings persistence. This study employs the measure in 

























Earn j, t                    Firm’s j net income before extraordinary items in year t; and 
Earn j, t−1                 Firm’s j net income before extraordinary items in year t-1. 
 
For each firm-year, we estimate Equation (2) using rolling five-year windows. The 
measure capturing earnings persistence is based on the slope-coefficient estimate (δ1, 
hereafter, Persist). Values of δ1 close to one (or greater than one) indicate highly 
persistent earnings while values close to zero imply highly transitory earnings. Persistent 
earnings are viewed as higher quality, while transitory earnings are viewed as lower 
quality. 
 
Earnings predictability  
Francis et al. (2004) measure earnings predictability using the square root of the 
estimated error-variance from the earnings-persistence equation. In this study, earnings 
predictability is calculated using the square root of the error variance from the equation of 
earnings persistence:   
)ˆ(Pr ,
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ˆ( )j tσ ν            Estimated-error variance of firm j in year t, calculated from Eq. (2). 
Our measure of earnings predictability is also derived from the firm- and year-
specific models. Large (small) values of predictability imply less (more) predictable 
earnings. More predictable earnings are viewed as higher quality, while less predictable 
earnings are viewed as lower quality. 
 
Earnings smoothness  
Bowen et al. (2003) measure earnings smoothness as the standard deviation of 
operating cash flows divided by the standard deviation of earnings. Similarly, Francis et 
al. (2004) measure earnings smoothness as the ratio of standard deviation of net income 
before extraordinary items divided by the total assets at beginning of year, to the standard 
deviation of cash flow from operations divided by total assets at beginning of year. Since 
all these measures of smoothness are closely related, this study adopts the one proposed 

















                                                                   (4) 
Where: 
σ                           Firm j’s standard deviation; 
CFO j, t                  Firm j’s operating cash flows in year t (indirect approach); and 
Earn j, t                  Firm j’s net income before extraordinary items in year t. 
Ratios in excess of one indicate more variability in operating cash flows relative to 
the variability of earnings, which implies the use of accruals to smooth earnings. Standard 
deviations are calculated over rolling five-year windows. Thus, large (small) values of 
Smoothj,t indicate more (less) earnings smoothness and low (high) earnings quality. 
 
MMH Firm-Year model 
According to McKeown et al. (1991), the MMH firm-year model classified a firm in 
the stressed category if it exhibited at least one of the following financial distress signals: 
(1) Negative working capital in the current year;  
(2) A loss from operations in any of the three years prior to bankruptcy;  
(3) A retained earnings deficit in year-3 (where year-1 is the last financial statement 
date preceding bankruptcy); and  
(4) A bottom-line loss in any of the last three pre-bankruptcy years.  
The MMH firm-year model is adopted in this study to classify Chinese listed firms as 
stressed and non-stressed in the classification of both bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms. 
 
The Emerging Market Score Model (EMS Model) 
According to Rosner (2003), prior literature and anecdotal evidence (most recently 
provided by allegations relative to Enron, Global Crossing, and Worldcom) suggest that 
failing firms (defined here as pre-bankruptcy firms) may be motivated to engage in 
financial reporting to conceal their distress. Rosner also explains that the bankruptcy 
classification is based on a firm’s ex-ante bankrupt state. Therefore, bankrupt firms were 
considered as pre-bankruptcy situations in Rosner’s study, as well as in this study. 
       Due to the imperfect delisting system in the Chinese stock exchange, we use the 
EMS model to split the sample observation of the firm-year into bankrupt and non-
bankrupt categories. The EMS model is a predictive model which combined four 
different financial ratios to determine the likelihood of bankruptcy amongst firms 
(Altman, 2006). This model was first developed in the mid-1990s to provide an analytical 
framework for the then-growing, but still nascent emerging market firms issuing bonds in 
nonlocal currency (usually US dollars) (Altman, 2006). 
The EMS model is as follows (Altman, 2006): 
 
6.56* 1 3.26* 2 6.72* 3 1.05* 4 3.25EMScore X X X X= + + + +                              (5) 
      EM Score below 0 indicates a bankrupt condition. 
Where  
X1 = working capital/total assets; 
X2 = retained earnings/total assets; 
X3 = EBIT/total assets; and 
X4 = book value of equity/total liabilities. 
 
Altman (2006) states that the EMS model was tested on samples of manufacturers and 
non-manufacturers, public firms, private firms, specific industries (e.g., retailers, 
telecoms, airlines, etc.), in over 20 countries including China, and its accuracy and 
reliability has remained high.   
      According to Altman (2006), the EMS system for rating emerging market credits is 
based first on a fundamental financial review derived from a quantitative risk model, and 
second, on the assessments of specific credit risks in the emerging market, to arrive at a 
final modified rating. This rating can then be used by the investors, after considering the 
appropriate sovereign yield spread, to assess equivalent bond ratings and intrinsic values. 
The foundation of the EMS model is an enhancement of the Z’’-Score model, resulting in 
an EMS and its associated bond rating equivalent (BRE) (Altman, 2006).  
 
4. Sample selection and basic statistics 
4.1. Data and sample selection 
The data consists of the firms that issued A-shares and have been listed in the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges for the years from 2003 to 2007. Since the 
computation of accruals quality and the MMH firm-year model require prior and 
subsequent year’s data, the analysis period is extended from 2000 to 2008. We calculate 
the earnings attributes by rolling over five-year windows; a firm is included in the year t 
sample if data are available in years t-4 to t. 
        To mitigate concern that differences in sample composition drive comparisons for 
each kind of firms, we further require that data on the variables used are available for 
each year in the sample period. The data are collected from the CSMAR Financial 
Databases developed by the Shenzhen GTA Information Technology Co. After we 
eliminate the firms that issued B-shares, the analysed sample consists of 987 firms with a 
total of 4935 firm-year observations for the period 2003-2007. 
Table 1 presents the classification of the firms in the sample. Two items are 
noteworthy. First, no firms fall under the classification of NSB, and therefore, we have 
only three kinds of firms (SB, SNB and NSNB) in this study. In addition, the earnings 
quality has deteriorated over time
2
 – as evidenced by the declining NSNB firm numbers 
from 483 (2003) to 344 (2007) and increasing numbers of SB and SNB firms from 42 to 
81 and 462 to 562 in 2003 and 2007, respectively. 
 
 ----------------------------  
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------- 
 
The sample statistics of relevant accounting variables and earnings attributes are 
presented in Table 2. On average, the sample SB, SNB and NSNB firms have positive 
future cash flow from operation, future non-discretionary net income and future change 
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 Table 4 reveals that NSNB (non-stressed and non-bankrupt) firms have the highest earnings quality for 
each of the four earnings attributes. SB (stressed and bankrupt) firms have the lowest earnings quality for 
each of the four earnings attributes. 
earnings (CFO t+1, NDNI t+1, and ∆NI t+1). The mean of discretionary accruals and non-
discretionary accruals (DAC and NDAC) are negative for SB and SNB firms. The NSNB 
firms have the lowest mean of accruals quality, earnings predictability and earnings 
smoothness, and SB firms have the highest mean of each earnings quality attribute. This 
evidence shows that NSNB firms are more likely to have better earnings quality than 




Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------- 
    
   The correlation coefficients between the variables and four earnings quality attributes 
are shown in Table 3. DAC has positive correlation with CFO t+1 for NSNB and SNB 
firms, and negative correlation with SB firms, indicating that NSNB and SNB firms have 
a higher future profitability than SB firms. In addition, the four earnings quality attributes 
exhibit small positive correlations among the four classifications of firms (except the 
correlations of predictability and smoothness for SB and SNB firms) indicating relatively 
little overlap among the four earnings quality attributes. The variables have small 
correlations with each other in the correlation matrix. 
 
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
---------------------------- 
 
5. Regression analyses 
        To follow Francis et al. (2004), we rank each attribute each year, and form deciles. 
High values of earnings persistence correspond to high earnings quality. By contrast, high 
values of accruals quality, earnings predictability, and earnings smoothness correspond to 
poor earnings quality. To be consistent across the four attributes, this study ranks 
earnings persistence in descending order and the other three attributes in ascending order, 
so that firms in the top decile (decile 1) have the best values of each earnings attribute, 
while firms in the bottom decile (decile 10) have the worst values of each earnings 
attribute. This study uses the decile rank of each attribute rather than its raw value, which 
reduces the effects of extreme observations and generates a new order with a precise 
range to calculate the regression results.  
       Table 4 provides means of the four-earnings attributes variables. We report means 
for both the raw and ranked variables. This table reveals that the SB (stressed and 
bankrupt) firms have the lowest earnings quality and the highest ranked variables for each 
of the four earnings attributes. The SNB (stressed and non-bankrupt) firms have a higher 
earnings quality and lower ranked variables compared with the SB (stressed and bankrupt) 
firms for each of the four earnings attributes. The NSNB (non-stressed and non-bankrupt) 
firms have the highest earnings quality and the lowest ranked variables for each of the 
four earnings attributes.  
 
 ---------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
---------------------------- 
 
Francis et al. (2004) examine the relation between earnings attributes and investors’ 
resource allocation decisions, using the cost of equity capital as a summary indicator of 
those decisions. Siregar and Utama (2008) investigate whether firms listed on the Jakarta 
Stock Exchange conduct efficient or opportunistic earnings management by examining 
discretionary accruals’ ability to signal future profitability, after controlling for current 
levels of operating cash flow and non-discretionary accruals. Therefore, in this section, 
we apply regression analyses to test the four hypotheses by employing the measure based 
on these two studies and using the following equation: 
, 1 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , ,
k





j, t   is the decile rank of firm j’s value of the kth earnings attribute in year t, 
       k = {AccrualsQuality, Persistence, Predictability, Smoothness}. 
DAC j, t = discretionary accruals; 
NDAC j, t = non-discretionary accruals;  
CFO j, t = cash flows from operating activities; and 
X j, t+1   is the future profitability, measured by each of the following variables.  
     1. CFO j, t+1 = one-year-ahead cash flows from operations  
     2. NDNI j, t+1 = one-year-ahead non-discretionary net income (OCF j, t+1 + NDAC j, t+1) 
     3. ∆NI j, t+1 = one-year-ahead change in earnings (NI j, t+1−NI j, t) 
All valuables scaled by total assets at beginning of years.  
Earnings are decomposed into three variables: discretionary accruals (DAC), non-
discretionary accruals (NDAC), and cash flow from operations (CFO) (Subramanyam, 
1996). DAC is the variable of interest, and if the type of earnings management is efficient, 
the coefficient (b1) will be positive. If the earnings management is opportunistic, the 
DAC coefficient (b1) will be either zero or negative (Siregar & Utama, 2008). 
Discretionary accruals (DAC) are defined as the residuals, and non-discretionary accruals 
(NDAC) are fitted values, both from Jones’ model (1991).  
      The variables of future profitability in the model have been validated by Siregar and 
Utama (2008). They state that earnings and discretionary accruals tend to have a 
stationary nature. The use of change in earnings will control for the stationary nature of 
discretionary accruals. Cash flows from operations and non-discretionary net income do 
not have a discretionary-accrual component, so they do not have the inherent problems of 
earnings. This evidence shows that among these three measures, it is believed that non-
discretionary net income (NDNI) and cash flows from operations (CFO) are more reliable 
than change in net income (∆NI) because they do not include any discretionary-accrual 
components. For comprehensiveness, we conduct separately 36 regressions with future 
profitability in the regression equation, as CFOj,t+1 , NDNIj,t+1, and ∆NI j,t+1, for each of 
the three firm classifications (i.e., NSNB, SNB, and SB firms), with each of the four 
earnings attributes (AccrualQuality, Earnings Persistence, Earnings Predictability, and 
Earnings Smoothness) included..      
 We now turn to interpreting the results of testing each hypothesis. As shown in Table 
5, evidence in support of Hypothesis 1, with the independent variable of accruals quality, 
would be indicated by a more positive value of b1 for NSNB firms, less positive value for 
SNB firms and negative value for SB firms. Table 5 reports results of the univariate 
regressions. The first column reports results of the regression using future cash flows 
from operations (CFO j, t+1): the NSNB firms b1 = 0.304 (P < 0.000), SNB firms b1 = 
0.159 (P < 0.012), SB firms b1=-0.125 (P < 0.208). The second column reports results of 
regression using non-discretionary non-income (NDNI j, t+1): the NSNB firms b1 = 0.171 
(P < 0.001), SNB firms b1 = 0.025 (P < 0.651), SB firms b1=-0.934 (P < 0.000). The third 
column reports results of regression using ∆NI j, t+1: the NSNB firms b1 = -0.078 (P < 
0.052), SNB firms b1 = -0.709 (P < 0.000), SB firms b1=-0.677 (P < 0.000).  
       Concerning the results for the variable of interest b1, we turn to testing the coefficient 
of non-discretionary accruals (b2). For NDNI j, t+1,  the results show that NSNB and SNB 
firms have positive and SB firms have negative coefficients (b2 = 0.443, P < 0.000; b2 
=0.289, P < 0.000; b2= -0.685, P < 0.352), respectively. The following results show 
regression using cash flow from operations on CFO j, t+1: the NSNB firms b3 = 0.589 (P < 
0.000), SNB firms b3 = 0.200 (P < 0.003), and SB firms b3=-0.086 (P < 0.427). 
Subramanyam (1996) states that both types of cash flow, from operations and non-
discretionary accruals, have incremental information content and improve earnings’ 
ability to predict future profitability. Therefore, the two variables are adopted here to 
analyze efficient or opportunistic earnings management for Chinese listed firms.  
        The results are consistent with our expectation and suggest that NSNB firms with 
the highest earnings quality prefer more efficient earnings management than SNB firms 
with higher earnings quality. SB firms with the lowest earnings quality are more likely to 
opportunistically manage earnings to avoid de-listing. In addition, this study finds that 
NSNB firms have positive coefficients insignificantly related to future profitability. SB 
and SNB firms have positive or negative coefficients insignificantly related to future 
profitability. The results are somewhat weaker, but we find that NSNB firms are better 




Insert Table 5 about here 
---------------------------- 
 
As shown in Table 6, we turn to the Hypothesis 2 with the independent variable of 
earnings persistence, which predicts that discretionary accruals make future profitability 
somewhat higher for SNB firms and the highest for NSNB firms, and the lowest for SB 
firms. The first column of Table 6 shows the regression results on CFO j, t+1: NSNB firms 
b1 = 0.297 (P < 0.000), SNB firms b1 = 0.161 (P < 0.011), SB firms b1=-0.120 (P < 0.240). 
The second column shows the results on NDNI j, t+1: NSNB firms b1 = 0.168 (P < 0.001), 
SNB firms b1 =0.024 (P < 0.658), SB firms b1= -0.950 (P < 0.000). The third column 
shows all the negative results of regression on ∆NI j, t+1. The coefficient b1 indicates that 
NSNB firms are more likely to be efficient, SNB firms are less likely to be efficient, and 
SB firms are opportunistic; these findings are consistent with our expectations.  
       The results of regression on CFO j, t+1 and NDNI j, t+1 show that NSNB firms have 
positive coefficients b2 = 0.064 (P < 0.373), 0.444 (P < 0.006), b3 = 0.587 (P < 0.000), 
0.143 (P < 0.008), respectively, which indicates that NSNB firms are likely to be more 
efficient than SNB firms, which have b2 = -0.020 (P < 0.807), 0.298 (P < 0.000), b3 = 
0.203 (P < 0.002), 0.063 (P < 0.272). SB firms seem opportunistic with coefficients b2 = -
0.135 (P < 0.805), -0.709 (P < 0.335), b3= -0.078 (P < 0.478), -0.867 (P < 0.000), 
respectively.      
        We turn to testing earnings persistence b4, and find that NSNB firms have positive 
significant and SNB firms have negative coefficients, significant with ∆NI j, t+1 (b4 
EarningsPersistence
 =0.045, P < 0.004; b4 
EarningsPersistence
 = -0.003, P < 0.000), respectively. In 
addition, NSNB firms have positive insignificant coefficients for CFO j, t+1 and NDNI j, t+1; 
while both SB and SNB firms have positive or negative insignificant coefficients. We 
interpret the results as suggesting that NSNB firms are better indicators than both SNB 
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As Table 2 shows, NSNB firms have large firm size (measured by total assets), which 
strongly impacts on earnings persistence. Frankel and Litov (2009) note that firm size can 
be related to a company’s earnings persistence because it indicates the strength of the 
company’s competitive position. On the other hand, SB firms have more volatile earnings, 
as shown by changes in earnings; this evidence shows that large earnings changes are 
more volatile and less persistent. Brooks and Buckmaster (1976) find that earnings tend 
to revert to levels observed prior to large earnings changes.  
       Table 7 shows the regression results with the independent variable of earnings 
predictability. The regressions on CFO j, t+1 and NDNI j,t+1 of NSNB firms have 
coefficients b1 = 0.277 (P < 0.000), 0.178 (P < 0.001), respectively, which indicates that 
NSNB firms are likely to be more efficient than SNB firms that have b1 = 0.158 (P < 
0.012), 0.024 (P < 0.653). SB firms seem opportunistic with coefficients b1= -0.104 (P < 
0.289), -0.905 (P < 0.000). In addition, for ∆NI j, t+1, NSNB, SNB and SB firms have b1=-
0.083 (P <0.049), -0.709 (P <0.000), -0.668 (P <0.000), respectively.  It is clear that 
NSNB and SNB firms are more likely to have efficient earnings management than SB 
firms because two out of three DAC coefficients are positive.  
      We turn to testing the coefficient of non-discretionary accruals (b2), for NDNI j, t+1,  
with the result that NSNB and SNB firms have positive coefficients and SB firms have 
negative coefficients (b2 = 0.451, P < 0.000, b2 =0.307, P < 0.000, b2= -0.440, P < 0.552), 
respectively. Next we test cash flow from operations (b3) for CFO j, t+1, finding that NSNB 
firms have more significant positive coefficients (b3 = 0.567, P < 0.000) than SNB firms 
(b3 = 0.200, P < 0.003), while SB firms have a negative coefficient (b3=-0.061, P < 0.567). 
The results reveal that NSNB firms more likely to have efficient earnings management 
than SNB firms, and SB firms are more likely to have opportunistic earnings 
management. 
       In addition, this study finds that NSNB firms have a positive coefficient with future 
profitability. In particular, NSNB firms have a significant positive coefficient on ∆NI j, t+1 
(b4 
EarningsPredictability
 = 0.009, P < 0.005). SB and SNB firms have an insignificant 
coefficient with future profitability. We interpret these results as indicating that NSNB 
firms are better indicators than both SNB and SB firms in predicting future profitability 
in relation to earnings predictability. 
 
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
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  Finally, Table 8 reports regression results with the independent variable of earnings 
smoothness. The results of regression on CFO j, t+1 and NDNI j,t+1 show that NSNB firms 
have coefficients b1 = 0.318 (P < 0.000), 0.160 (P < 0.004), respectively, which indicates 
that NSNB firms are likely to be more efficient than SNB firms, which have b1 = 0.157 
(P < 0.013), 0.021 (P < 0.701). SB firms seem opportunistic with coefficients b1= -0.120 
(P < 0.226), -0.925 (P < 0.000). For ∆NI j, t+1, these three firms have the negative 
coefficient b1.  
       With the regressions on CFO j, t+1 and NDNI j, t+1, NSNB firms show positive 
coefficients b2 = 0.087 (P < 0.247), 0.430 (P < 0.000), b3 = 0.607 (P < 0.000), 0.137 (P < 
0.014), respectively, which indicate that NSNB firms are likely to be more efficient than 
SNB firms, which have b2 = -0.043 (P < 0.594), 0.277 (P < 0.000), b3 = 0.194 (P < 0.004), 
0.051 (P < 0.371). SB firms seem opportunistic with coefficients b2 = -0.093 (P < 0.865), 
-0.611 (P < 0.407), b3= -0.074 (P < 0.865), -0.835 (P < 0.000), respectively.      
        Next, we turn to testing earnings smoothness b4, and find that NSNB firms have the 
positive insignificant coefficients for CFO j, t+1, NDNI j, t+1 and ∆NI j, t+1.  Both SB and 
SNB firms show positive or negative insignificant coefficients. In particular, SNB firms 
have a negative significant coefficient on ∆NI j, t+1 (b4 
EarningsSmoothness
 = -0.004, P < 0.000). 
We interpret the results as showing that NSNB firms are better indicators than both SNB 
and SB firms in predicting future profitability in relation to earnings smoothness. 
 
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
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       Based on the above analysis of the four hypotheses, we find that the DAC j, t (b1) is of 
the most interest to us as a measure of earnings management, as it is significantly related 
to the three measures of future profitability (CFOj,t+1 , NDNIj,t+1, and ∆NI j,t+1,); but most 
of the four earnings quality attributes (b4) have an insignificant relationship with the 
future profitability measures. This finding suggests that earnings management performs 
better than earnings quality in predicting future profitability. Kallunki and Martikainen 
(2003) demonstrate that earnings management is a better metric to predict future 
profitability, because firms use discretionary accruals to manage this year’s earnings 
upwards/downwards, if they believe that the next year’s earnings will be high/low. 
Similarly, a high-quality earnings number will be a good indicator of future performance. 
However, a low-quality earnings number is insufficient to guarantee a prediction of future 
performance (Francis et al., 2004).   
 
6. Sensitivity analysis 
 
Our results are robust, as shown with the following sensitivity analyses: 
 
1. Changes in EMS default equivalent rating (D) 
         According to Altman (2006), actual EMS default equivalent rating (D) scores below 
1.75 are used as the proxy for D (in the main test, EMS default equivalent rating of 0 is 
rated D). We consider the default equivalent rating as 1.75 to estimate the type of 
earnings management and the effect of earnings quality for Chinese listed firms. The 
results show that there are also three categories (SB, SNB and NSNB) of Chinese listed 
firms. Then we repeat the cross-sectional tests for the four hypotheses. The main results 
show quite a similar pattern for earnings management with the main test. 
2. Using Z’’ – Score Model (1993 Altman model) 
         While consistent with the 1993 Altman model
3
, we perform an alternative 
bankruptcy model to classify the Chinese listed firms. This particular model is also useful 
within an industry where the type of financing of assets differs greatly among firms and is 
subject to important adjustments (Altman, 1993). Calculating earnings management 
based on the three types of firms (SB, SNB and NSNB), we obtained similar results and 
conclude that our findings are robust for the main test. 
3. Changes in scaling the accounting variables by average  
The main earnings management tests are based on scaling by the beginning total 
assets. We used the average total assets instead to calculate the earnings management for 
the three classifications of firms. These results also do not differ qualitatively from the 
results in our main analysis. 
4. Changes in accruals quality model 
We evaluate the robustness of our findings to use the level of total accruals as the 
measure of accrual quality. Firms with larger values of total accruals are expected to have 
more opportunistic earnings management than firms with smaller values of total accruals. 
Results using the total accruals measure are similar to these results based on accruals 
quality. 
5. Using ROA persistence model 
 
                                                 
3
 Z’’ = 6.56 (X1)+ 3.26 (X2) + 6.72 (X3) +1.05 (X4) 
Z’’ < 1.10 = Zone I (no errors in bankruptcy classification). 
Where  
X1 = working capital/total assets; 
X2 = retained earnings/total assets; 
X3 = EBIT/total assets; and 
X4 = book value of equity/total liabilities. 
 
 
Dechow and Schrand (2004) evaluated persistence of earnings and ROA to calculate 
which one is more persistent. With respect to the cross-sectional tests of earnings 
persistence, we adopt ROA to identify the persistence
4
 for SB, SNB and NSNB firms. 
Results show that NSNB firms have a more positive coefficient than SNB firms, and that 
SB firms have a negative coefficient. 
 
7. Conclusion and remarks 
This paper investigates the relation between earnings management and four 
attributes of earnings: accrual quality, persistence, predictability, and smoothness. We 
examine the type of earnings management and the effect of earnings quality in Chinese 
listed firms. In addition, we adopt the MMH firm-year model and EMS model to split the 
Chinese listed firms into four categories – SB, SNB, NSB and NSNB firms. Due to the 
zero sample size, the NSB firms cannot be effectively identified. Our research therefore 
focuses only on three types of firms: SB, SNB and NSNB.  
Using the different types of Chinese firms listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchange from 2003-2007, we find that the stressed/bankrupt firms are likely to 
become opportunistic in earnings management, and the non-stressed/non-bankrupt firms 
are more inclined to choose more efficient earnings management than stressed/non-
bankrupt firms. We find that earnings management performs better than earnings quality 
in predicting future profitability. We also find that as the earnings quality has deteriorated 
over the sample period, the number of stressed/bankrupt firms increases and the number 
of non-stressed/non-bankrupt firms decreases.  
                                                 
4
 The regression model is as the following: 
ROA j,t = a+ b* ROA j,t-1 +ε j,t-1 
Where b is the cash flow persistence parameter. 
The findings of this study have practical value for regulators, auditors and 
researchers. With respect to regulators, they will be better able to develop and implement 
corporate governance provisions to prevent managers’ opportunistic behavior. With 
respect to auditors, they may understand better how managers exercise the discretion 
inherent in accounting standards to mask poor performance in financially troubled firms. 
With respect to researchers, our results suggest that a focus on four earnings quality 
attributes would allow for more sharply delineated comparisons in benchmarking 
earnings numbers or reporting systems that are linked to investors’ resource allocation 
decisions.  
Our results are subject to the following limitations. Because China has recently 
growin in its global economic activity, its economic system and business environment 
need to be improved; data availability and quality may be a major concern for obtaining 
empirical results. Due to the imperfect delisting system in China, we use the EMS model to 
classify observations of firm-years as bankrupt and non-bankrupt. Although the EMS model was 
tested in over 20 countries including China, the reliability of using the EMS model in 
China should be further identified.  
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Table 1. The classification of firms in the sample 
The samples listed on A-shares and in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges for the years from 2003 to 
2007. There were no firms classified as NSB. Therefore, we have only three types of firms (SB, SNB and 
NSNB) in this study. The final sample consists of 987 firms with a total of 4935 firm-year observations for 














 Stressed Non-stressed Total 
2003    
Bankruptcy 42 0 42 
Non-bankruptcy 462 483 945 
Total 504 483 987 
2004    
Bankruptcy 58 0 58 
Non-bankruptcy 501 428 929 
Total 559 428 987 
2005    
Bankruptcy 78 0 78 
Non-bankruptcy 541 368 909 
Total 619 368 987 
2006    
Bankruptcy 87 0 87 
Non-bankruptcy 566 334 900 
Total 653 334 987 
2007    
Bankruptcy 81 0 81 
Non-bankruptcy 562 344 906 
Total 643 344 987 
Table 2. Statistics of relevant accounting variables and earnings attributes 
  Mean Std.Dev 10% 25% Median 75% 90% 
Panel A: Stressed-bankrupt firms (SB) 
CFO j, t+1 0.089 0.763 -4.827 -0.004 0.012 0.066 8.852 
∆NI j, t+1 0.210 0.753 -5.353 -0.029 0.141 0.314 4.706 
NDNI j, t+1 0.082 1.122 -10.654 -0.068 0.014 0.088 12.000 
DAC  j, t -0.154 0.975 -11.929 -0.226 -0.099 0.032 5.317 
NDAC j, t -0.039 0.091 -0.614 -0.076 -0.027 0.014 0.203 
CFO j, t 0.124 0.894 -0.341 -0.008 0.011 0.047 12.003 
TA j, t 0.843 0.433 
 
0.007 0.645 0.823 0.962 4.041 
AccrualQuality 0.108 0.195 0.001 0.025 0.063 0.125 2.519 
Persistence 0.403 2.129 -17.130 -0.161 0.009 0.460 14.968 
Predictability 0.209 0.245 0.005 0.081 0.127 0.240 1.839 
Smoothness 0.255 0.382 0.020 0.097 0.137 0.248 3.817 
Panel B: Stressed-nonbankrupt firms (SNB) 
CFO j, t+1 0.074 0.269 -1.870 0.007 0.055 0.114 6.429 
∆NI j, t+1 0.005 0.123 -2.530 -0.014 0.005 0.028 1.468 
NDNI j, t+1 0.036 0.232 -1.019 -0.037 0.018 0.082 4.975 
DAC  j, t -0.011 0.202 -4.714 -0.069 0.000 0.061 2.448 
NDAC j, t -0.033 0.114 -0.705 -0.091 -0.031 0.018 1.928 
CFO j, t 0.069 0.172 -0.970  0.014 0.060 0.110 5.101 
TA j, t 1.137 0.588 0.146 0.963 1.048 1.171 14.982 
AccrualQuality 0.061 0.082 0.000 0.014 0.035 0.078 1.470 
Persistence 0.311 0.988 -13.261 -0.128 0.162 0.628 9.864 
Predictability 0.042 0.059 0.000 0.011 0.026 0.056 1.298 
Smoothness 0.079 0.173 0.008 0.039 0.055 0.080 3.176 
Panel C: Nonstressed and nonbankrupt firms (NSNB) 
CFO j, t+1 0.043 0.136 -1.411 0.002 0.018 0.086 0.786 
∆NI j, t+1 0.011 0.087 -0.717 -0.008 0.006 0.029 1.439 
NDNI j, t+1 0.042 0.117 -0.616 -0.016 0.038 0.091 0.722 
DAC  j, t 0.022 0.123 -1.008 -0.032 0.016 0.078 1.111 
NDAC j, t 0.007 0.089 -1.032 -0.036 0.012 0.051 0.663 
CFO j, t 0.029 0.087 -0.431 0.002 0.009 0.035 1.559 
TA j, t 1.225 0.915 0.249 1.019 1.101 1.231 24.894 
AccrualQuality 0.054 0.093 0.000 0.012 0.029 0.056 1.201 
Persistence 0.538 1.200 -8.483 0.004 0.445 0.930 12.634 
Predictability 0.020 0.021 0.000 0.007 0.013 0.024 0.295 
Smoothness 0.056 0.065 0.003 0.028 0.043 0.066 1.040 
This study measures the four attributes on a firm- and year-specific basis, using the relevant accounting 
information for rolling five-year windows, t-4,…t. So the firm-years 2001 to 2005 are used to calculate the 
earnings attributes for the year 2005; the firm-years 2002 to 2006 for the year 2006; and the firm-years 
2003 to 2007 for the year 2007.  
CFO j, t+1 = cash flows from operation one year ahead, ∆NI j, t+1 = change in earnings one year ahead, NDNI 
j, t+1 = non-discretionary net income one year ahead, DAC j, t = discretionary accruals, NDAC j, t = non-
discretionary accruals, CFO j,  t  = cash flows from operation, TA j,  t = total assets, AccrualQuality = the 
standard deviation of firm j’s residuals from a regression of current accruals on lagged, current, and future 
cash flows from operation, Persistence = the slope-coefficient estimates of current earnings on last year’s 
earnings, Predictability = the square root of the error variance from firm j’s persistence model, Smoothness 
= the ratio of firm j’s standard deviation of cash flows from operations (scaled by assets)  to the standard 
deviation of earnings before extraordinary items (scaled by assets).  
Table 3.  Pearson correlation coefficients 
Variables CFO j, t+1 ∆NI j, t+1 NDNI j, t+1 DAC j, t  NDAC j, t  CFO j, t  AccrualQuality Persistence Predictability Smoothness 
Panel A: Stressed-bankrupt firms (SB) 
CFO j, t+1 1.000          
∆NI j, t+1 0.027 1.000         
NDNI j, t+1 0.683 0.443 1.000        
DAC j, t -0.074 -0.200 -0.225 1.000       
NDAC j, t -0.005 -0.002 0.003 -0.062 1.000      
CFO j, t 0.040 -0.027 0.019 -0.858 -0.014 1.000     
AccrualQuality 0.032 0.052 0.009 -0.053 -0.030 0.108 1.000    
Persistence -0.022 -0.086 -0.062 0.117 -0.004 0.009 0.090 1.000   
Predictability -0.138 -0.030 -0.152 0.014 0.154 0.018 0.091 0.236 1.000  
Smoothness -0.053 0.029 -0.077 -0.070 0.088 0.085 0.130 -0.001 0.730 1.000 
Panel B: Stressed-nonbankrupt firms (SNB) 
CFO j, t+1 1.000          
∆NI j, t+1 0.124 1.000         
NDNI j, t+1 0.859 0.160 1.000        
DAC j, t 0.035 -0.277 -0.077 1.000       
NDAC j, t -0.076 -0.068 0.135 -0.440 1.000      
CFO j, t 0.047 0.006 0.020 -0.697 -0.083 1.000     
AccrualQuality -0.042 -0.004 0.056 -0.069 0.199 -0.040 1.000    
Persistence -0.037 -0.097 0.029 -0.054 0.126 0.006 0.105 1.000   
Predictability -0.055 -0.015 0.003 -0.068 0.159 -0.020 0.196 0.314 1.000  
Smoothness 0.018 0.042 0.080 -0.150 0.174 0.106 0.199 -0.171 0.612 1.000 
Panel C: Nonstressed and nonbankrupt firms (NSNB) 
CFO j, t+1 1.000          
∆NI j, t+1 0.168 1.000         
NDNI j, t+1 0.671 0.115 1.000        
DAC j, t 0.055 -0.048 -0.111 1.000       
NDAC j, t -0.132 -0.040 0.217 -0.700 1.000      
CFO j, t 0.245 0.091 0.034 -0.495 0.041 1.000     
AccrualQuality 0.060 0.027 0.038 -0.032 0.138 -0.060 1.000    
Persistence 0.046 0.018 0.038 -0.025 0.035 -0.048 0.044 1.000   
Predictability 0.110 0.004 0.023 0.080 0.015 0.143 0.122 0.021 1.000  
Smoothness 0.025 0.001 0.076 0.034 0.112 0.103 0.264 0.064 0.307 1.000 
The table reports the Pearson correlations for SB, SNB and NSNB firms. Definitions of variables can be found in Tables 2. There are total 346 SB, 2632 SNB 
and 1957 NSNB firm-year observations. Significance at the 5% level (two-tail). 
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Table 4: Earnings attribute variables (raw and rank data) used in this study 
 
Note: These earnings attribute variables are based on rolling over five-year windows; a firm is included in 
the year t sample if data are available in year t-4 to t. Then this study ranks each attribute each year, and 
forms deciles. High values of earnings persistence correspond to high earnings quality. By contrast, high 
values of accruals quality, earnings predictability, and earnings smoothness are indicative of poor earnings 
quality. To be consistent across the four attributes, this study ranks earnings persistence in descending order 
and the other three attributes in ascending order, so that firms in the top decile (decile 1) have the best 
values of each earnings attribute, while firms in the bottom decile (decile 10) have the worst values of each 
earnings attribute. Stdresid is the standard deviation of estimated residual for accruals quality. Persist is 





























Earnings Attributes SB SNB NSNB 
Stdresid   0.108                0.061                0.054                
Persist 0.245 0.311 0.538 
Pred 0.210              0.042              0.020              
Smooth 0.255                  0.079                   0.056                   
Rank(Stdresid)               6.837                             5.584                             5.056                             
Rank(Persist)                 6.321 5.801                           4.848 
Rank(Pred)               9.341 5.761 4.184                         
Rank(Smooth) 9.081 5.619 4.472 
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Table 5. Regression on future profitability with AccrualQuality (decile ranking) 
 
Variable CFO j, t+1   NDNI j, t+1   ∆NI j, t+1  
 Coef p value  Coef p value  Coef p value 
Panel A: Stressed-bankrupt firms (SB) 
DAC j, t  -0.125 0.208  -0.934 0.000  -0.677 0.000 
NDAC j, t -0.131 0.811  -0.685 0.352  -0.533 0.271 
CFO j, t -0.086 0.427  -0.856 0.000  -0.665 0.000 
AccrualsQuality  0.009 0.603   0.015 0.529  -0.024 0.128 
Adj.R
2
 -0.008    0.156    0.188  
Panel B: Stressed-nonbankrupt firms (SNB) 
DAC j, t   0.159 0.012  0.025 0.651  -0.709 0.000 
NDAC j, t -0.018 0.827  0.289 0.000  -0.706 0.000 
CFO j, t  0.200 0.003  0.065 0.258  -0.613 0.000 
AccrualsQuality -0.003 0.279  0.002 0.211   0.000 0.581 
Adj.R
2
  0.010   0.018    0.359  
Panel C: Nonstressed and nonbankrupt firms (NSNB) 
DAC j, t   0.304 0.000  0.171 0.001  -0.078 0.052 
NDAC j, t  0.077 0.292  0.443 0.000  -0.114 0.019 
CFO j, t  0.589 0.000  0.147 0.006   0.040 0.327 
AccrualsQuality  0.002 0.231  0.000 0.905   0.000 0.712 
Adj.R
2
  0.100   0.054    0.010  
CFO j, t+1 = cash flows from operation one year ahead, ∆NI j, t+1 = change in earnings one year ahead, NDNI 
j, t+1 = non-discretionary net income one year ahead, DAC j, t = discretionary accruals, NDAC j, t = non-
discretionary accruals, CFO j, t  = cash flows from operation, AccrualQuality = the standard deviation of 























Table 6. Regression on future profitability with Earnings Persistence (decile ranking) 
 
Variable CFO j, t +1   NDNI j, t +1   ∆NI j, t +1  
 Coef p value  Coef p value  Coef p value 
Panel A: Stressed-bankrupt firms (SB) 
DAC j, t  -0.120 0.240  -0.950 0.000  -0.675 0.000 
NDAC j, t -0.135 0.805  -0.709 0.335  -0.553 0.256 
CFO j, t -0.078 0.478  -0.867 0.000  -0.655 0.000 
Persistence -0.001 0.961   0.016 0.504   0.006 0.710 
Adj.R
2
 -0.009    0.156    0.181  
Panel B: Stressed-nonbankrupt firms (SNB) 
DAC j, t   0.161 0.011   0.024 0.658  -0.707 0.000 
NDAC j, t -0.020 0.807   0.298 0.000  -0.691 0.000 
CFO j, t  0.203 0.002   0.063 0.272  -0.610 0.000 
Persistence -0.003 0.225   0.001 0.649  -0.003 0.000 
Adj.R
2
  0.010    0.017    0.364  
Panel C: Nonstressed and nonbankrupt firms (NSNB) 
DAC j, t   0.297 0.000   0.168 0.001  -0.080 0.047 
NDAC j, t  0.064 0.373   0.444 0.000  -0.117 0.015 
CFO j, t  0.587 0.000   0.143 0.008   0.039 0.342 
Persistence  0.001 0.447   0.002 0.179   0.045 0.004 
Adj.R
2
  0.099    0.056    0.010  
CFO j, t+1 = cash flows from operation one year ahead, ∆NI j, t+1 = change in earnings one year ahead, NDNI 
j, t+1 = non-discretionary net income one year ahead, DAC j, t = discretionary accruals, NDAC j, t = non-
discretionary accruals, CFO j, t = cash flows from operation, Persistence = the slope-coefficient estimates of 























Table 7. Regression on future profitability with Earnings Predictability (decile 
ranking) 
 
Variable CFO j, t+1   NDNI j, t+1   ∆NI j, t+1  
 Coef p value  Coef p value  Coef p value 
Panel A: Stressed-bankrupt firms (SB) 
DAC j, t  -0.104 0.289  -0.905 0.000  -0.668 0.000 
NDAC j, t  0.054 0.922  -0.440 0.552  -0.555 0.260 
CFO j, t -0.061 0.567  -0.821 0.000  -0.648 0.000 
Predictability -0.084 0.036  -0.112 0.037   0.004 0.916 
Adj.R
2
  0.010    0.170    0.180  
Panel B: Stressed-nonbankrupt firms (SNB) 
DAC j, t   0.158 0.012   0.024 0.653  -0.709 0.000 
NDAC j, t -0.015 0.854   0.307 0.000  -0.702 0.000 
CFO j, t  0.200 0.003   0.063 0.268  -0.613 0.000 
Predictability -0.004 0.080  -0.002 0.451   0.000 0.668 
Adj.R
2
  0.001    0.017    0.359  
Panel C: Nonstressed and nonbankrupt firms (NSNB) 
DAC j, t   0.277 0.000   0.178 0.001  -0.083 0.049 
NDAC j, t  0.043 0.558   0.451 0.000  -0.120 0.016 
CFO j, t  0.567 0.000   0.154 0.006   0.036 0.395 
Predictability  0.002 0.229   0.001 0.679   0.009 0.005 
Adj.R
2
  0.100    0.054    0.010  
CFO j, t+1 = cash flows from operation one year ahead, ∆NI j, t+1 = change in earnings one year ahead, NDNI 
j, t+1 = non-discretionary net income one year ahead, DAC j, t = discretionary accruals, NDAC j, t = non-
discretionary accruals, CFO j, t = cash flows from operation. Predictability = the square root of the error 





















Table 8. Regression on future profitability with Earnings Smoothness (decile 
ranking) 
 
Variable CFO j, t+1   NDNI j, t+1   ∆NI j, t+1  
 Coef p value  Coef p value  Coef p value 
Panel A: Stressed-bankrupt firms (SB) 
DAC j, t  -0.120 0.226  -0.925 0.000  -0.668 0.000 
NDAC j, t -0.093 0.865  -0.611 0.407  -0.577 0.237 
CFO j, t -0.074 0.492  -0.835 0.000  -0.652 0.000 
Smoothness -0.031 0.396  -0.060 0.222   0.022 0.493 
Adj.R
2
 -0.006    0.160    0.182  
Panel B: Stressed-nonbankrupt firms (SNB) 
DAC j, t   0.157 0.013   0.021 0.701  -0.712 0.000 
NDAC j, t -0.043 0.594   0.277 0.000  -0.721 0.000 
CFO j, t  0.194 0.004   0.051 0.371  -0.622 0.000 
Smoothness  0.003 0.305   0.005 0.026  -0.004 0.000 
Adj.R
2
  0.010    0.020    0.364 0.000 
Panel C: Nonstressed and nonbankrupt firms (NSNB) 
DAC j, t   0.318 0.000   0.160 0.004  -0.085 0.043 
NDAC j, t  0.087 0.247   0.430 0.000  -0.124 0.014 
CFO j, t  0.607 0.000   0.137 0.014   0.035 0.412 
Smoothness  0.002 0.314   0.001 0.477   0.000 0.636 
Adj.R
2
  0.099    0.054    0.010  
CFO j, t+1 = cash flows from operation one year ahead, ∆NI j, t+1 = change in earnings one year ahead, NDNI 
j, t+1 = non-discretionary net income one year ahead, DAC j, t = discretionary accruals, NDAC j, t = non-
discretionary accruals, CFO j, t  = cash flows from operation, Smoothness = the ratio of firm j’s standard 
deviation of cash flows from operations (scaled by the beginning total  assets)  to the standard deviation of 
earnings before extraordinary items (scaled by the beginning total  assets); 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
